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In the 2010 general elections in Hungary, the socialist-liberal government was ousted and Fidesz, a 
conservative party, secured a constitutional (two-third) majority in the Parliament. Using its 
comfortable majority, Fidesz started a series of large-scale institutional reforms, including the 
adoption of a new constitution. Several policy and institutional areas were also  fundamentally 
reformed, such as the system of social benefits, the rules and institutions of local governance, the 
educational system, the media authority, and the electoral system – just to name a few.  
However, the legitimacy of these hasty reforms is far from being obvious. The paper follows the 
approach of Tom Tyler and others who argue that perceptions of procedural fairness are crucial in 
the formation of legitimacy beliefs. Tyler also argues that people do not obey the law and assist in 
implementing policies because they fear the sanctions or hope for rewards. Rather, they put trust in 
these mechanisms and institutions, because people think that they are legitimate. That is, legitimacy 
spurs law-abiding behaviour and makes policy implementation easier, which is a requirement for 
effective policy making. 
Our assumption is that the way reforms have been adopted in Hungary has violated a number of 
basic procedural fairness norms, like those of voice and participation. We also assume that 
Hungarians are just as sensitive to procedural fairness as Americans or Western Europeans are. 
Therefore, we would expect discontent among the Hungarian population in terms of procedural 
fairness, and, as a consequence, falling trust in, and legitimacy of, state policies and institutions. 
Survey data seems to confirm our hypotheses. Through our own survey research, we demonstrate 
that the perception of procedural unfairness is related to uncooperative attitudes towards policies 
and institutions, which decrease their effectiveness. The paper, therefore, aims at establishing 
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conceptual and empirical links between procedural fairness, legitimacy and institutional 
effectiveness. 
 
 
Legitimacy, trust and institutional effectiveness 
 
A foundational thesis in political science is that effective governance needs some level of public 
support, acceptance, and allegiance. Democratic systems might need even more than their non-
democratic counterparts, because they are limited in their use of coercion and bound to building 
cooperative relations with citizens. More trust in and more legitimacy of the political system implies 
a greater likelihood of cooperation, which, in turn, may affect the effectiveness of political and state 
institutions. 
Legitimacy may make people more willing to defer to the law and to the decisions of legal 
authorities, such as the police and the courts (Tyler 1990). Without legitimacy, people may be less 
likely to support government programs that redistribute economic resources, for example 
(Hetherington 2005). Legitimacy shapes citizens’ reactions to government policies (Weatherford 
1992) and provides a government with a way of eliciting citizen support without appeals to the 
individual’s immediate self-interest. In this way, legitimacy can increase citizen support for war 
efforts (Leff 1991; Levi 1997), for instance, and compliance with health regulations during an 
epidemic (Lieberman 2007).  
Talking about specific institutions, like the law, the police or the municipality, one should rather use 
the term trust instead of legitimacy, as since Max Weber, legitimacy is taken to be linked to the 
political system as such. In this vein, we can argue that higher trust may contribute to more effective 
institutional performance and easier policy implementation (Tyler 2006). For instance, many studies 
argue that trust in police produces readiness to cooperate with the police (see the review by Hawdon 
2008).  To put it differently, the effectiveness of police may improve as trust increases and so does 
the degree of satisfaction with their performance. A similar mechanism was demonstrated in terms 
of taxation: trust in the tax authority increases not only the willingness to pay taxes, but also the 
actual amount of collected taxes (Murphy 2005, Kahan 2002, Scholz 1998). 
The concept of legitimacy or public trust is a complex one. David Beetham argues that “legitimacy is 
not a single quality that systems of power possess or not, but a set of distinct criteria, or multiple 
dimensions, operating at different levels, each of which provides moral grounds for compliance or 
cooperation on the part of those subordinate to a given power relation” (Beetham, 1991:20). In this 
paper, we will not present Beetham’s whole conceptual construction, such as the criteria, dimensions 
and levels mentioned in this quote. However, we will follow his approach which challenges a 
widespread ‘value-free’ concept of legitimacy – popularized, for instance, by Niklas Luhmann – which 
captures legitimacy in a ‘descriptive’ relationship of the subordinates to those in power. Beetham is 
not normative either in his intentions, but he argues that allegiance relies on moral concepts which 
should be taken into account. 
“The effectiveness of the powerful, in other words, is not just a matter of resources and organisation, 
as the ‘realists’ would contend, but also of their legitimacy. The realists are at this point simply not 
3 
 
realistic enough; they do not take people seriously as moral agents, or recognise that what the 
powerful can get others to do depends upon normative considerations as well as upon the resources 
and organisational capacities at their command” (Beetham, 1991: 29). 
But what are these normative considerations? We may think that as political cultures are different 
from each other, people in different countries will use different normative criteria to formulate a 
supportive relation to politics. Michael Walzer has convincingly argued that moral concepts cannot 
be applied universally, because, first, different social spheres and contexts imply different norms and 
values even within a society2, and, second, moral cultures are different across societies (Walzer, 
1983). Even if this argument holds, however, it still may be the case that beyond the differences 
some commonalities also exist among societies, especially regarding how they interpret the moral 
background of a legitimacy claim. 
At least this is the claim advanced by Levi, Sacks and Tyler (2009). They accept the approach followed 
also by Beetham: “Legitimacy derives from the beliefs citizens hold about the normative 
appropriateness of government structures, officials, and processes” (Levi, Sacks and Tyler, 2009: 
354). They model legitimacy as a sense of obligation or willingness to obey authorities (value-based 
legitimacy) that then translates into actual compliance with governmental regulations and laws 
(behavioral legitimacy). Their conceptual model posits that value-based legitimacy has two 
antecedent conditions: trustworthiness of government and procedural justice. Government 
trustworthiness breaks into three further components: leadership motivations, administrative 
competence, and government performance (Levi, Sacks and Tyler, 2009: 356). The authors claim that 
these conditions apply across cultures: they actually tested their model in an African context. We 
believe that their empirical results make the model especially convincing, therefore it deserves a 
more detailed presentation here. 
Let us have a short look at the component parts of their model.  
Leadership motivation is undeniably difficult to detect; however, people are constantly monitoring 
leadership behaviour and the supposed underlying motives. Trustworthiness relies on two basic 
characteristics of leader behaviour: “walking their talk”, so to speak, “by making sacrifices that 
demonstrate their willingness to put their money where their mouth is”, and demonstrating their 
commitment to some kind of general interest, even by “submitting to limits on their power” (Levi, 
Sacks and Tyler, 2009: 358). 
Administrative competence “… has two attributes: honesty and the capacity to implement rules and 
regulations” (Levi, Sacks and Tyler, 2009: 358). Honesty is perceived in terms of procedural fairness 
norms, while the capacity to implement rules is what we may also call institutional effectiveness. 
Government performance is also one of the factors that lead to legitimizing beliefs about the 
governance. “One possible basis for legitimating beliefs is the provision of public goods the 
population requires to ensure at least a minimal level of social welfare, such as drinkable water, 
roads, post offices, electricity, piped water, and sanitation” (Levi, Sacks and Tyler, 2009: 358). In 
other words, the government should evidently be able to fulfil its tasks in terms of providing things 
like security and welfare. This refers to the well-known concept of output legitimacy. 
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Leadership motivations, administrative competence, and government performance thus constitute 
the trustworthiness of government. Together with government trustworthiness, Levi, Sacks and 
Tyler’s (2009) model has one more crucial component: procedural justice.  
 
 
This model of value-based legitimacy stresses the importance of the principles of procedural justice 
(note that they are implied already under administrative capacity), and relatively undervalues the 
importance of government performance in shaping legitimacy. This runs contrary to a well-
established tradition in political science which stresses the importance of output legitimacy and 
states that allegiance towards the political system and its institutions is shaped by the goods 
delivered to people. Under this latter tradition, people “care about ends not means; they judge 
government by results and are . . . indifferent about the methods by which the results were 
obtained” (Popkin 1991: 99). 
Indeed, there is empirical evidence supporting the output- or performance-based trust hypothesis: 
for instance, a general observation is that trust in government is more volatile than trust in 
constitutional courts (Grosskopf, 2003). Presumably the performance of governments is seen as 
being less stable than that of the courts; moreover, people are also more likely to attribute certain 
social, economic and political problems to the government than the constitutional court. Perceived 
institutional performance3 certainly has an effect upon trust. 
However, other findings suggest that sometimes trust and performance show surprisingly weak 
relation to each other (Smith et al. 2007: 288). Such findings lead della Porta, for example, to ask 
“why policy outputs . . . play such a minor role in shaping confidence in democratic institutions” 
(2000: 202) and Pharr to conclude that “policy performance . . . explains little when it comes to 
public trust” (2000: 199). Tom Tyler argues that this is indeed the case, suggesting that trust is rather 
explained by the procedural fairness used by these institutions. 
 
Procedural fairness 
 
The model of value-based legitimacy, as advanced by Tom Tyler, David Beetham and others, is not 
normative in its intentions. However, it does take into account that people use normative, value-
driven criteria when forming evaluative attitudes towards institutions. More specifically, Tyler argues 
that the fairness of the procedures used by the given institution is under the close scrutiny of 
stakeholders. 
In fact, the importance of procedural fairness in shaping trusting and cooperative attitudes has been 
proven in a number of different institutional settings. Many studies argue, for instance, that trust in 
the police is first and foremost affected by perceptions of fairness and that trust produces both a 
readiness to cooperate with the police and a positive attitude in evaluating their performance (see 
the review by Hawdon 2008). Murphy (2005) found that in Australia, tax evasion was correlated with 
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perceived unfairness of the tax authority. This explains why strict sanctions seemingly paradoxically 
did not have a positive effect on the willingness to pay tax. Instead, these measures triggered more 
tax evasion. Similarly, Gangl (2003) argues that people’s perceptions about the legitimacy of the 
American Congress are more influenced by considerations of procedural fairness than by the 
distributive effects (outcomes) of the decisions. Breitmeier, Young and Zürn (2006) analysed the 
effectiveness of international environmental regimes and concluded that it is largely influenced by 
the perceptions about the fairness of the regime’s formation. The above examples provide evidence 
that (1) legitimacy of, or trust in, institutions is a function of the perceived procedural fairness of 
institutions; and (2) fair procedures may enhance the effectiveness of given institutions (e.g., police, 
tax authority). 
How can we explain the significance of procedural fairness in shaping trust and legitimacy? Smith et 
al. (2007: 285) note that “Much of the procedural justice literature offers no greater theoretical basis 
for the empirical results than the assertion that people simply desire procedural justice, and saying 
’that is just the way people are’ does not constitute a theory”. The importance of procedural fairness 
has thus been observed, but not explained. Smith et al. intend to fill this lacune and propose an 
approach based on evolutionary theory. They argue that evolutionary theory offers a theoretical 
account of people’s sensitivity to strictly procedural, and other “nonoutcome” variables (which do 
not in any way reflect the substance of the decision outcome), such as the intention of the decision 
maker. They relate the sensitivity to “nonoutcome” evaluative criteria to an evolutionary explanation 
of leadership. 
“Evolutionary pressures may have led to the predisposition of some human beings to be sensitive to 
nonoutcome factors because groups in which no one cares about group health are likely to find 
themselves at a disadvantage. In this sense, evolutionary theory helps to explain findings in the 
procedural justice literature as well as our findings on people’s aversion to decision makers who 
desire power or who use power to benefit themselves at others’ expense” (Smith et al. 2007: 296)  
That is, evolutionary pressures create a need for leadership in human groups in order to fulfil the role 
of organizing the community, but only a „good” leadership – that which seeks to promote the 
general interest – is valuable. People’s ethical sensitivity has the function of detecting the real 
intentions and character of potential leaders. 
This also implies that a mixed strategy (in game theoretical terms) of trusting and distrusting is the 
most useful for human communities. Although the literature on trust has a tendency to idealize it, 
and argue that the lack, or the decline of public confidence, is a problem to address, some arguments 
challenge this view. In fact, democracy could be interpreted as a political system which 
institutionalizes distrust by separating the branches of power and establishing a sophisticated system 
of checks and balances. In this respect, exaggerated trust in one element of the system, either in the 
government or in the ruling party, can be interpreted as a potentially dangerous development that 
might lead to the decline of democratic culture and the erosion of the rule of law, as people may 
relay their sensitivity to scrutinize and hold accountable the rulers. 
But how should procedural fairness be defined? Philosophers and social scientists have devoted 
much less attention to the concept of procedural fairness as such, although some of its elements 
have been extensively studied. For instance, a number of classical human rights, such as the right to 
fair trial and right to non-discriminatory treatment, clearly expresses norms of fair procedures and 
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are extensively treated in political philosophy. Another procedural fairness norm, participation in 
decision-making has become the topic of an increasing body of literature (see, e.g., Dryzek, 2000). 
Communicative ethics is an influential theory by Karl-Otto Apel (1990) and Jürgen Habermas (1990) 
that developed procedural norms for fair communication. Although the theory was initially 
elaborated in order to determine the circumstances which may lead to the development and 
acceptance of legitimate ethical norms, it can also be applied to more practical situations, as it 
provides the criteria for valid, that is, normatively legitimate speech. That is, it provides ethical 
criteria by which to judge the validity, acceptability and legitimacy of a communication. The 
communicative situation must be free of coercion, and not distorted by power relations, and the 
communication must use rational arguments to convince the other parties. According to Apel and 
Habermas, the validity of speech lies in its intelligibility (valid meaning), truthfulness (subjective 
authenticity), factual truth and correctness (normative justifiability).4 
In general terms, Leventhal (1980) identified six criteria of procedural justice: representativeness 
(participation), suppression of bias (impartiality), consistency (equal treatment and consistency over 
time), accuracy (informed and high-quality decision making), correctability (of unfair or mistaken 
decisions), and ethicality (conformity to general moral standards). This last criterion should not be 
interpreted to mean that procedural fairness encompasses all kinds of ethical values; it only indicates 
that norms other than those listed in the first five criteria may also influence the perception of 
procedural fairness. It is clear that procedural fairness is a complex phenomenon. Using results of 
psychological research, Machura (1998) argues that throughout the socialization process we all 
internalize some kind of “procedural justice heuristics”, which are difficult to define in very precise 
terms, but which are used in evaluating social settings. We can add that procedural fairness does 
certainly have different meanings for different political institutions, or, more precisely, different 
criteria for procedural justice are used in evaluating the fairness of different institutions. 
In terms of governance, respect for basic procedural fairness norms means that the government is 
trustworthy; offers possibilities for participation; and respects the rule of law. This also implies that 
leaders keep their promises, fight corruption, and respect ethical norms, among other things. If the 
above-mentioned models are true as to the relationships between procedural fairness and legitimacy 
on the one hand, and legitimacy and effectiveness, on the other hand, then we could expect that 
governance is more successful in those countries where governance is good in terms of fairness 
norms. Indeed, there is some evidence supporting this thesis, see the literature on good governance 
(Boda 2013).  
 
The case of Hungary 
In the 2010 general elections in Hungary, the socialist-liberal coalition was defeated and Fidesz, a 
conservative party, secured a constitutional (two-thirds) majority in the Parliament. This allowed the 
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party/government to initiate a number of fundamental policy reforms which required a qualified 
majority.  
The 2010 elections were preceded by four years of political turmoil, which started in 2006 when 
Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány (2004-2008) gave a secret speech to his fellow socialist politicians.. 
He admitted that during the Spring 2006 election campaign he had been lying about the economic 
prospects of the country and that the reality was much bleaker. The speech was leaked to the media 
in September 2006 and it immediately triggered violent reactions. Street demonstrations began 
which lasted for several months. Polls indicated that the majority of the public thought that the 
Prime Minister had been lying to the Hungarian citizenry, as well as to the EU. The President of the 
Republic, László Sólyom said that Hungary was in a “moral crisis” and that the Prime Minister should 
have resigned. 
The disclosure of this speech was of major importance both for Gyurcsány’s career, and for the 
development of Hungary in the upcoming years. Despite the street demonstrations and protests 
througout Fall 2006, Gyurcsány did not resign until 2008 when his own, and his party’s, popularity 
attained historical lows. However, during his tenure, Gyurcsány was unable to carry on with the 
reforms and his own political programme. All the important policy reforms he initiated, like the 
privatization of the social security system, failed. The case of Gyurcsány actually provides support for 
the thesis that it is impossible to govern effectively without public support and that public support I 
at least partly the function of the moral credibility of the leaders. 
Hungary’s economic growth continued to be the slowest in the Central and Eastern European region 
throughout the late 2000s. The financial crisis hit Hungary hard, and only the rescue package of the 
IMF and the EU saved the economy from collapsing. As a consequence, Hungary’s external debt grew 
from 52% of the GDP in 2002 to 85% in 2010. Hungary, which was a leader of economic reforms in 
the 1990s, with relatively high economic growth, lost its strong position in the region. 
The economic and political problems of the 2000s certainly explain the unprecedented victory of 
Fidesz in 2010, which was accompanied by great expectations among the Hungarian populace. In 
May 2010, for a short period, 80% of the respondents answered that they believed the country was 
heading in a good direction; previously, only 20% had thought so. In 2010, after a long and steady 
decline, trust in institutions and politicians suddenly rose (see Figure 2.). 
 
Figure 2. Institutional trust in Hungary, 2002-2010. (Source: ESS data) 
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The phenomenon is what Hetherington (2005) describes as the dynamic nature of trust: While trust 
is based on the experience/perception of a performance by a given institution, it expresses an 
expectation as well, as it is concerned with the future. In 2010, Hungarian people felt a relatively high 
trust towards the new government, which was an expression of hope and positive expectations. 
Using its comfortable constitutional (two-thirds) majority, Fidesz initiated large-scale institutional 
reforms, including even the adoption of a new constitution. Several policy and institutional areas 
were also fundamentally reformed, like the system of social benefits, the rules and institutions of 
local governance, the educational system, the media authority, and the electoral system – just to 
name a few. Again, in line with Hetherington’s argument (above) on the close association between 
trust and wide-scale reforms (Hetherington 2005), the new Hungarian government made use of its 
public support to implement substantial policy changes. However, as Boda (2012) argued, the new 
government had violated a number of procedural fairness norms, such as participation, voice, 
transparency, the rule of law, and fighting against corruption. Several new laws and policies were 
heavily debated by both internal and external publics (the media or even the European Parliament) 
on their alleged violations of the rule of law.5 In 2011, according to polls, the majority of respondents 
– including even Fidesz supporters – agreed that the new constitution should have been endorsed by 
a referendum.6 Our own survey taken in April 2011 showed that agreement with the statement that 
“the government would do a better job if it consulted the opinion of people and civil society” scored 
7.7 points on a 10-point scale. If Tyler’s procedural fairness theory holds, then this had to lower the 
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 A good summary of these issues is provided by the Tavares report on Hungary to the European Parliament, 
see at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A7-2013-
0229&language=EN. See also Kim Lane Schappele’s comment on rule of law violations in Hungary and the 
Tavares report: http://hungarianspectrum.wordpress.com/2013/07/03/kim-lane-scheppele-in-praise-of-the-
tavares-report/.  
6
 Lásd http://www.median.hu/object.d659e526-d25f-4444-b928-4551cee46d87.ivy (downloaded on 2011 
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level/perception of government legitimacy. And indeed, this seems to be the case: According to polls, 
trust in political institutions and in the government has been steadily declining (see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. Trust in political institutions in Hungary 2010-2012 (government, parliament and political 
parties). (Source: Medián Polling Company.) 
 
 
 
However, economic problems have persisted over/for the past four years. Hungary found 
itself in recession again in 2012 and growth was very moderate in the other years, both before and 
after 2012. Several hundred thousand people left the country seeking for jobs elsewhere in the EU, 
which is in sharp contrast with the very modest migration prior 2012. As of March 2014, some 75% of 
the population says that the country is heading in the wrong direction. So here, even if legitimacy 
problems can be detected, a basic question is whether they were caused by the violation of 
procedural fairness norms or the perceived poor policy outcome. 
The question is especially intriguing given the lack of relevant research in the Eastern and Central 
European region on the role of procedural fairness in shaping trust and legitimacy. As Bradford et al. 
(2013) note, the priority of procedural-based trust over outcome-based trust has been mostly 
demonstrated by samples taken in the United States and in the United Kingdom and has rarely been 
tested in other contexts. The authors therefore performed a case study in South Africa and showed 
that while the strength of the relationship between trust and procedural fairness was far from 
negligible, perceptions of police effectiveness were stronger predictors of trust in the police. The 
probable reason for this, according to them, is that South Africa is a gravely divided society struck 
with high levels of crime, which causes severe concerns for citizens. Similar results were found in the 
case of China, where outcome-based considerations showed a significant effect on the level trust in 
the police as opposed to procedural-based considerations, the influence of which could hardly be 
detected (Sun et al. 2013). However, this result may not be too surprising because in an 
undemocratic regime like in China, procedural fairness may also become less relevant for trust. 
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Although these works were concerned with trust in police, the case can be generalized: We do not 
know whether normative legitimacy and procedural fairness have the same weight in social and 
political contexts different from Western Europe and the US.   
 
Research questions 
 
Our aim is to study the role of procedural fairness in shaping legitimacy beliefs in Hungary. The 
alternative explanation is obviously the output-legitimacy idea – that people approve political 
leadership because of its perceived good performance. That is not to say that the two explanations 
are mutually exclusive. They both may have an effect on legitimacy. But our primary concern here is 
to detect the presence and the effect of procedural-based legitimacy, which has not been 
demonstrated so far in the context of Eastern and Central European countries. We take Hungary as a 
typical case in the region, as Hungary shows great similarity to other ECE countries in terms of those 
key macro-level factors (level of development, level of inequality, regime type and years of 
democratic experience), which are usually reported to influence institutional trust (see Medve-Bálint 
and Boda 2014. 
In this paper, however, we present our first findings on the effect of fairness considerations on 
legitimacy. Our hypotheses were the following: 
H1: Perceptions of procedural fairness do have an effect on the legitimacy of laws. 
H2: Perceptions of procedural fairness do have an effect on the legitimacy of the government.  
We assume that laws represent legislative power, which is obviously linked to the government, but is 
still distinct from it. We conducted a representative survey of the Hungarian population in November 
2013, where we asked people about their perceptions concerning the government, laws and some 
specific institutions (police and tax authority). The sample is representative for the Hungarian adult 
population with respect to gender, age and educational attainment.7 
In the survey we introduced two questions that serve as dependent variables in the current analysis. 
The first question measured on a five-point scale the degree of agreement with the statement “The 
laws and the public authorities serve everyone’s interest”, while the second one measured 
agreement with the statement “The government works for everyone’s benefit”. The correlation 
coefficient between the two indicators is fairly strong (r = .536, p < .001, N= 1181), but this figure also 
suggests that the two variables capture related, yet slightly different aspects of legitimacy. 
Regarding the independent variables, we selected several indicators from the survey that measure 
various dimensions of public perception of the state and its institutions.8 In this vein, we chose 
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 The sample consists of 1200 observations (respondents). The respondents were randomly selected from 120 
territorial sampling units, of which boundaries were drawn proportionally to the size of population. Within 
each unit, the interviewers visited 10 randomly selected households and within each household an adult 
respondent (above 18 years of age) was selected according to the Leslie Kish formula. In the case of non-
response, the household was replaced with another, randomly selected one from the sampling unit. This 
process continued until the quota for the sampling unit was filled. 
8
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variables reflecting the individual perceptions of institutional effectiveness and procedural fairness, 
and social and political trust, as well as political activity and the respondents’ party preferences. To 
obtain a proxy for institutional effectiveness, we inquired about how much the respondents agreed 
with the statement that democracy was functioning well in Hungary and that things were going into 
the right direction. With respect to procedural fairness, we proposed several statements and asked 
the degree of agreement with them. The statements were the following: the rule of law prevails in 
Hungary; every Hungarian citizen has equal rights; corruption is a serious problem in the country; and 
the government pays attention to the opinion of the people and professional and civic organizations. 
These statements refer to the procedural norms of equality, respecting the rights of each, unbiased, 
ethical operations and participation – in line with what was said about procedural fairness above. In 
each case, the degree of agreement was measured on a five-point scale, although later we recoded 
the corruption variable into a binary scale. Similarly, we measured social trust on a five-point scale 
with a question that inquired about the degree of agreement with the claim that people are 
generally trustworthy. We measured political trust with a composite indicator that aggregated the 
trust scores of the government, parliament and political parties (each question was initially measured 
on a 4-point scale) and then we re-coded the aggregate scores to a 10-point scale. Finally, we 
included some socio-demographic variables, like age, gender, education, income and place of 
residence of the respondents. 
However, as Table 1 reveals, several potential independent variables are highly correlated with each 
other. The indicators of institutional effectiveness are especially strongly associated with each other 
and with some of the measures of procedural fairness and political trust. 
We therefore calculated Cronbach’s alpha for six highly correlated variables (democracy, good 
direction, rule of law, equal rights, political trust, and government attention) to test whether these 
indicators indeed measure the same background concept. The test score was high (.836) for these 
items, which confirmed that the variables are strongly related to one another. We also ran a principal 
component analysis on these indicators, which produced a single component (each factor loading 
was above .75) explaining 65.37 percent of the total variance with an Eigenvalue of 3.922. These 
statistical tests suggest that our indicators of institutional effectiveness, procedural fairness and 
political trust capture different aspects of the same grand concept of confidence in the state and its 
associated institutions. Consequently, we had to exclude some of these variables from our regression 
models in order to minimize the problems arising from multicollinearity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Correlation matrix of the independent variables  
 
Democracy 
Good 
direction 
Rule of 
law 
Equal 
rights Corruption 
Government 
attention 
Political 
trust 
Social 
trust 
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Democracy 1 .706
**
 .608
**
 .612
**
 -.207
**
 .578
**
 .532
**
 .280
**
 
Good direction .706
**
 1 .625
**
 .595
**
 -.235
**
 .629
**
 .609
**
 .220
**
 
Rule of law .608
**
 .625
**
 1 .678
**
 -.175
**
 .522
**
 .477
**
 .234
**
 
Equal rights .612
**
 .595
**
 .678
**
 1 -.143
**
 .514
**
 .487
**
 .277
**
 
Corruption -.207
**
 -.235
**
 -.175
**
 -.143
**
 1 -.179
**
 -.266
**
 -.003 
Government 
attention 
.578
**
 .629
**
 .522
**
 .514
**
 -.179
**
 1 .563
**
 .168
**
 
Political trust .532
**
 .609
**
 .477
**
 .487
**
 -.266
**
 .563
**
 1 .164
**
 
Social trust .280
**
 .220
**
 .234
**
 .277
**
 -.003 .168
**
 .164
**
 1 
** 
significant at 99 per cent;
 * 
significant at 95 per cent 
 
For Model 1 we chose the dependent variable that measured agreement with the statement “The 
laws and public authorities serve everyone’s interest”. We introduced a single indicator of 
institutional effectiveness (good direction) into the model, while adding two variables representing 
perceptions of procedural fairness (equal rights and corruption). In addition, we included the 
indicators of political trust, social trust and political activity, as well as dummy variables representing 
party preferences. Finally, we selected a range of control variables (age, gender, place of residence, 
level of education and income) for inclusion. The results of the first regression model are summarized 
in Table 2. 
The results reveal that the indicators of institutional effectiveness (good direction) and procedural 
fairness (equal rights) have the greatest explanatory power. Both of them show a significant positive 
relationship with the degree of agreement with the statement tested. In other words, those 
respondents who believed that the country was in a generally good condition and its public 
institutions ensured equal treatment of the citizens, on average, also tended to report higher 
confidence in the idea that in the law and public authorities serve the common good. In addition, 
social and political trust also demonstrate a significant positive relationship with the dependent 
variable, although their effects are somewhat smaller. Interestingly, perceptions of corruption show 
no relationship with the legitimacy of laws – that is, those who believe corruption is a serious 
problem in Hungary regard the laws with as much legitimacy as those who do not consider 
corruption to be a problem. Another surprising finding is that party preferences do not play a role 
here, as none of the voters with a party choice showed any significant differences from the reference 
group of indecisive or reluctant voters. 
 
 
 
Table 2. Summary of Model 1 (dependent variable: The law and state authorities serve the public 
interest) 
 B Std. Error Beta VIF 
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(Constant) .695
*** 
.114   
Fidesz
a 
-.076 .088 -.033 2.480 
Összefogás
a
 -.053 .082 -.020 1.735 
Jobbik
a
 -.096 .106 -.026 1.416 
LMP
a
 .270 .191 .036 1.115 
Unrevealed party preference
a
 -.178 .130 -.036 1.232 
Other party
a
 -.141 .343 -.010 1.041 
Good direction .258*** .032 .284 2.236 
Equal rights .319*** .029 .342 1.654 
Corruption
b 
.084 .063 .034 1.121 
Political trust .041** .017 .085 2.083 
Political activity -.075 .065 -.029 1.129 
Social trust .102*** .028 .094 1.131 
Age (centred) .000 .002 .002 1.249 
Age centred squared .000 .000 .022 1.095 
Budapest .233*** .077 .080 1.209 
Male -.088 .055 -.039 1.053 
Secondary education
c 
.062 .066 .025 1.272 
Higher education
c
 -.052 .086 -.017 1.451 
Income .000 .001 -.013 1.482 
N 1026 
F-value 38.997
**
 
R
2 
(adjusted) .413 
Robust standard errors 
** 
p < .05;
 *** 
p < .01 
a
 reference group: respondents who do not have a party preference or would not vote in elections 
b 
reference group: respondents who do not consider corruption as a serious problem in Hungary 
c
 reference group: respondents with basic educational attainment 
 
In Model 2, we tested the effects of the above indicators on the variable measuring the respondents’ 
agreement with the statement “The government works for everyone’s benefit”. This dependent 
variable bears greater political connotation than the previous one, because the government may be 
easily identified with the ruling parties. Thus, we expected that people’s view on this matter would 
differ more along party preferences than in the previous case. The results of Model 2 are 
summarized in Table 3. 
Similar to the first case, perceptions of institutional effectiveness and procedural fairness proved to 
have high explanatory power, but this time political trust also showed a comparably strong and 
significant positive association with the dependent variable. As expected, compared to the reference 
group, those who voted for Fidesz indicated greater confidence that the government’s actions were 
beneficial for the people. In this sense, this aspect of legitimacy seems to be more politicized than 
the previous one.  
 
 
 
Table 3. Summary of Model 2 (Dependent variable: The government works for the people’s 
benefit) 
 B Std. Error Beta VIF 
(Constant) .359
*** 
.107   
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Fidesz
a .390
*** 
.082 .154 2.485 
Összefogás
a
 .046 .077 .016 1.744 
Jobbik
a
 .002 .099 .000 1.413 
LMP
a
 .053 .179 .006 1.115 
Unrevealed party preference
a
 .122 .120 .023 1.240 
Other party
a
 -.035 .321 -.002 1.041 
Good direction .281
*** 
.030 .285 2.223 
Equal rights .205
*** 
.027 .201 1.649 
Corruption
b -.105 .059 -.039 1.123 
Political trust .146
*** 
.016 .277 2.076 
Political activity .042 .061 .015 1.130 
Social trust -.018 .026 -.015 1.130 
Age (centred) -.000 .002 .000 1.249 
Age centred squared .000 .000 .021 1.095 
Budapest .106 .071 .033 1.207 
Male -.065 .052 -.027 1.054 
Secondary education
c -.087 .062 -.033 1.270 
Higher education
c
 -.193
** 
.080 -.060 1.449 
Income .000 .001 -.014 1.479 
N 1026 
F-value 71.653
***
 
R
2 
(adjusted) .567 
Robust standard errors 
** 
p < .05;
 *** 
p < .01 
a
 reference group: respondents who do not have a party preference or would not vote in elections 
b 
reference group: respondents who do not consider corruption as a serious problem in Hungary 
c
 reference group: respondents with basic educational attainment 
 
 
Our results clearly indicate that Hungarian people do not share an exclusive output-oriented 
approach when it comes about legitimacy believes. The personal income of the respondents does not 
have an effect of legitimacy believes, that is, the individual economic situation does not influence 
people’s trusting attitudes towards the law or the government. Socio-tropic evaluation, that is, the 
belief that the country as such is heading into the good direction (that we took for a proxy of 
government effectiveness) does indeed play a role in grounding legitimacy. However, other 
normative considerations, like the faith in individual rights, do also matter. We found that the 
consideration of equal rights proved to have a significant effect on the dependent variables in both 
of our models. We believe that the principle of the equality of rights expresses an important 
procedural fairness norm in the political context, therefore we conclude that – in line with the 
mainstream literature on trust and legitimacy – procedural fairness considerations influence people’s 
legitimacy believes in Hungary as well. Actually it seems to have a similar weight than effectiveness 
(output-legitimacy) considerations. 
Let us highlight two more details from the above results. First, that party preferences did not have an 
effect on the legitimacy of the law. This is important, because Hungarian political culture is believed 
to be extremely polarized where the opposing political camps share little about the perception of 
both the political problems and their desired solutions that country should face and embrace 
(Körösényi 2012). Party preferences play some role in grounding the legitimacy of the government, 
but this is understandable, as the government was set up by the ruling party. Second, corruption 
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perceptions did not have a significant effect in any of our models. This may suggest that some, but 
not all, procedural fairness norms are important for Hungarian people. However, in other studies 
corruption deemed to be important – for instance Boda and Medve-Bálint (2015) found that trust in 
the police in Hungary was largely influenced by corruption perceptions.  Actually, in that study some 
other procedural fairness norms, like that of lack of discrimination, had no statistical effect on the 
dependent variable. This calls our attention to the importance of institutional contexts: procedural 
fairness is a complex phenomenon and it has different expressions in different social and political 
settings.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The 2010 election in Hungary resulted in the victory of Fidesz, a conservative party which acquired a 
comfortable majority in the parliament. As polls clearly demonstrated, the advent of Fidesz into 
power was accompanied by great expectations from the population in light of both the poor 
performance of socialist governments in previous years and the 2008 financial crisis that hit the 
country hard. Fidesz indeed introduced a number of reforms and policy changes through a rapid 
series of legislative measures. Expert opinions state that both the way these reforms were adopted 
and their content violated a number of procedural fairness norms, such as participation in decision 
making and even some aspects of the rule of law. Although no systematic research has been 
conducted on public opinion in this respect, some survey results suggest that people, even those who 
voted for Fidesz, were critical towards those norm breaching phenomena. According to David 
Beetham, Tom Tyler and others, legitimacy is dependent on moral evaluations concerning the ruling 
power, and among those evaluations, perceptions of the procedural fairness being exercised by the 
authorities are of a crucial importance. If the theory holds, then the legitimacy of Fidesz’s rule would 
have eroded over the years, and indeed this is what happened. by 2012 trust in the government and 
in political institutions has dropped to the levels seen before the 2010 elections. But since economic 
problems have persisted, we cannot say whether this drop was caused by discontent with 
governmental performance or procedural fairness or both. Our research aims at investigating the 
role of procedural fairness in the formation of legitimacy beliefs. 
Our preliminary analysis demonstrates that procedural fairness may indeed have a role in shaping 
legitimacy. In our model  the statement concerning equal rights in Hungary had the strongest 
explanatory power predicting the belief that laws and authorities serve the common good, even 
stronger than party preference or the belief that the country is heading in a good direction (which 
expresses satisfaction with governance performance). The legitimacy of the government is more 
strongly explained by party preference; however, the role of procedural fairness remains significant 
in that model as well. 
To our knowledge, our research is the first to deal with the role of procedural fairness in shaping 
legitimacy in the Eastern and Central European region. This is not to say that procedural fairness is 
the only and the most important factor shaping legitimacy. Our model reflects just one possible 
approach. However, we believe that it at least demonstrates that further research should seriously 
take into account the role of procedural fairness and its perceptions in shaping legitimacy beliefs. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Description of the variables 
Dependent variables 
The law serves public interest 
The laws and the public authorities 
serve everyone’s interest 
0: do not agree at all; 4: fully agree 
The government works for 
people’s benefit 
The government works for 
everyone’s benefit. 
0: do not agree at all; 4: fully agree 
Indicators of the perception of institutional effectiveness 
Democracy 
All things considered, democracy 
functions well in our country. 
0: do not agree at all; 4: fully agree 
Good direction 
All in all, things are going to the 
right direction in Hungary. 
0: do not agree at all; 4: fully agree 
Indicators of institutional trust 
Political trust 
Political trust (government, 
parliament, political parties) 
0: do not trust at all; 9: fully trust 
Indicators of the perception of institutional procedural fairness 
Rule of law The rule of law prevails in Hungary. 0: do not agree at all; 4: fully agree 
Equal rights 
Every Hungarian citizen has equal 
rights. 
0: do not agree at all; 4: fully agree 
Corruption 
Corruption is a serious problem in 
Hungary. 
0: do not agree at all/rather do not 
agree/neutral; 1: rather agree/fully 
agree 
Government attention 
The government pays attention to 
the opinion of the people, 
professional and civic 
organizations. 
0: do not agree at all; 4: fully agree 
Indicator of political activity 
Political activity 
In the past two years the 
respondent participated in an 
activity related to politics or public 
affairs. 
0: no; 1: yes 
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Indicator of interpersonal trust 
Social trust People are generally trustworthy  0: do not agree at all; 4: fully agree 
Political preferences 
Fidesz Fidesz voter 0: no; 1: yes 
Összefogás Voter of the Left Alliance 0: no; 1: yes 
Jobbik Jobbik voter 0: no; 1: yes 
LMP LMP voter 0: no; 1: yes 
Do not vote 
Do not have a party preference 
/would not vote 
0: no; 1: yes 
Unrevealed party preference Do not reveal party preference 0: no; 1: yes 
Other party Voter of another party 0: no; 1: yes 
Control variables 
Age (centred) 
Age centred around the grand 
mean 
0: respondent of average age 
(48.21 years) 
Age centred squared Age centred squared  
Budapest Budapest inhabitant 0: no; 1: yes 
Male Male respondent 0: no; 1: yes 
Basic education 
Maximum 8 years of completed 
education / vocational school  
0: no; 1: yes 
Secondary education Completed secondary education 0: no; 1: yes 
Higher education 
Higher education degree (BA or 
higher) 
0: no; 1: yes 
Income 
Per capita household income in 
thousands of forints, centred 
around the grand mean 
0 = 91,824 HUF (appr. 300 EUR) 
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Descriptive statistics of the variables 
 N Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis 
The law serves the public interest 1190 2.18 1.112 -.152 -.580 
The government works for the people’s benefit 1189 1.80 1.217 .070 -.865 
Democracy 1179 1.91 1.111 -.006 -.619 
Good direction 1181 1.79 1.240 .073 -1.002 
Rule of law 1176 2.30 1.084 -.151 -.529 
Equal rights 1188 2.01 1.199 -.048 -.859 
Government attention 1173 1.81 1.156 -.015 -.808 
Political trust 1173 3.60 2.301 .110 -.928 
Social trust 1200 2.09 1.015 -.270 -.341 
Income 1100 91.82 46.763 1.562 5.229 
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